Monetary retentions for subcontract work: a risk-based approach by Abeysekera, Vasantha & Soysa, Mohantha
 CIOB Construction Conference 2012 
1 
 
MONETARY RETENTIONS FOR SUBCONTRACT WORK:  
A RISK-BASED APPROACH 
 
 
Vasantha Abeysekera
*
 
Faculty of Engineering and Surveying, University of Southern Queensland, Australia  
and  
 
Mohantha Soysa 
Costpro Limited - Construction Cost Consultants, New Zealand 
 
                                                          
*
 Corresponding Author: E-mail- vasantha.abeysekera@usq.edu.au 
 CIOB Construction Conference 2012 
2 
 
MONETARY RETENTIONS FOR SUBCONTRACT WORK:  
A RISK-BASED APPROACH 
 
ABSTRACT 
The subcontracting culture in New Zealand is such that the same retention regime imposed on 
contractors is imposed on subcontractors by and large. This paradoxically fair contractual 
practice of back-to-back terms results in high retention rates (10%) and long defects liability 
periods set from contractor’s practical completion which has caused concerns for subcontractors 
with no rational basis for resolving such concerns. This study investigates this phenomenon from a 
risk based perspective to understand the link between risk and retentions particularly in relation to 
current practice. Accordingly, it is found that current retention rates do not show an association 
with overall risk computed as a product of likelihood and consequence based on contractors’ 
perceptions. However, when risk is viewed through these two components, it is seen that trades 
with high default risks for either likelihood or consequence results in high retention rates. 
Additionally, it is also seen that high risk is associated with subcontractor-harsh retention regimes 
with some exceptions lowering the strength of this association suggesting the need to investigate 
such trades to understand whether there are other overwhelming reasons for such exceptions. 
Thus, it is concluded that risk and retention regimes are linked to this extent although for a given 
level of risk, subcontractor friendly or unfriendly regimes could be achieved by a mix of different 
retention rates and release mechanisms. In this regard, it is seen that contractors seem to prefer 
high retention rates than longer defects liability periods for trades which have high risk levels. A 
further understanding about this relationship could be developed by undertaking a study on 
perceived overall risk levels and perceived retention regimes. 
Keywords: contracting culture, defects liability period, retentions, retainage, subcontracting 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The practice of retaining a percentage of money from payments due to a subcontractor is not new. 
During the last few decades, subcontractors have from time to time raised their concerns about this 
practice particularly with regard to rates, release mechanisms, and abuse. Given the freedom to 
contract, the practice continues, without much differentiation with most subcontractors being treated 
alike irrespective of whether their performance or the type of work they do.  
 
Retentions have been labelled as a wasteful practice (Latham, 1994, 1997). Yet, it continues to be 
used in formal construction. Interestingly, it is a practice that could be used by main contractors to 
generate a positive cash flow without having to seek funds from commercial banks using what 
Abeysekera (2006) has labelled as the retention differentiation strategy. From time to time, a number 
of authors have pointed out the beastly nature of retentions suggesting solutions such as retention 
bonds, trust accounts, retention-based funds, and through legislative arrangements (Abeysekera, 2003, 
2005, 2008; Pearman, 2004; Robinson, 2002) which are often not readily available to subcontractors. 
Moreover, practices vary world over with different rates and release mechanisms.  
 
Given this background, this study pursues a greater understanding of ways and means of dealing with 
retentions by attempting understand the nature of risk-retention relationship.  
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2.0 CONTRACTING CULTURE IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
Most of the building construction work in New Zealand is outsourced particularly in the formal 
construction sector. This includes the supply of materials like pre-cast concrete products and also 
work that involves a component of labour with or without materials. It is for such types of work that 
retentions seem to be applied which raises fundamental questions on the purpose of retentions which 
almost all standard-form contracts have failed to define (Abeysekera, 2012) whether it is in work 
contracted by clients or work undertaken by subcontractors. Given that subcontracting is common and 
there is no indication that it will change in the near future, sometimes with almost 85% of the work 
subcontracted particularly in large building projects, this practice of handing work to teams 
specialising in various types of work needs greater attention for construction to be managed 
efficiently.  
 
One common feature of such work is that imposition of retentions particularly in the formal 
construction sector imposing back-to-back contract terms on subcontractors meaning that quite often 
the same retention regime is applied to subcontractors (Abeysekera, 2012). Prima-facie this seems fair 
and reasonable. However, given that main contractor’s get their retentions released partly on practical 
completion and the rest at the end of the defects liability period, it is not surprising that subcontractors 
have a genuine cause for concern if and when such regimes are applied.  
 
Interestingly, New Zealand employs a sliding retention regime in most projects (Abeysekera, 2006) 
with a retention rate of a high of 10% with progress claims up to NZ $ 200,000 with the percentage of 
deduction declining as the size of the subcontract package becomes bigger with an effective rate of 
around of 1.75% when the value of the work reaches $8 million whilst capping retentions at this level 
(i.e. no retentions once this turnover is achieved). Of course, with larger projects, the retentions used 
are different (see, Abeysekera, 2008). Nevertheless, the sliding retention regime is used frequently as 
noted above. In order to maximise retentions, some main contractors deliberately limit the monetary 
value of subcontract work packages to $ 200,000 so that the retention rate of 10% could be held! 
Although main contractors circumvent retention deductions by providing a retention-bond to clients, 
such facilities do not seem to be available to subcontractors. Even if it was the case, subcontractors 
may not wish to provide bonds as it costs money to get a bank guarantee but more importantly 
submission of bank bonds and guarantees tie up capital and erode lines of credit. It is also worth 
noting that it is rare for subcontractors to provide non-bank securities (say a guarantee from an 
insurance company) or for that matter performance or retention bonds. Accordingly, employing back-
to-back contract terms do not seem to have manifested as a subcontractor-friendly option in New 
Zealand. Is subcontracting really risky…? 
 
As noted before, subcontracting is common in New Zealand. Specialisation has advantages: when 
work is handled by small groups there is greater opportunity for work to be done right-the-first-time, 
on time, to specifications, and as per other contractual obligations and other benefits that come from 
similarity and familiarity of work. However, experience shows that this is not necessarily the case and 
subcontracting seems risky as not all subcontractors discharge their contractual and other duties 
diligently for one reason or the other despite years of experience and expertise of performing similar 
work!  
 
In other words, contractors are exposed to risk when subcontracting – a level of uncertainty with 
respect to the performance of subcontractors – the possibility that an unknown and unexpected event 
with adverse consequences could take place irrespective of whether a particular subcontractor is 
considered reliable, trustworthy, diligent, or not – all of which must be managed by the main 
contractor.  
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3.0 RISK AND RETENTIONS 
 
What types and levels of risks do contractors’ face when contracting subcontractors? It can be stated 
that a main contractor carries three primary risks: 
 
 Subcontractor will default;  Misunderstandings due to the extent of work the 
subcontractor has priced and what the main contractor 
expected. 
 Subcontractor cannot perform 
and/or at the rate required;  
 
In other words, a subcontractor having started could abandon the job altogether. The project could 
suffer due to delayed completions, quality problems (including repeat work and defects detected upon 
work completion), health and safety issues, non-compliance with the laws of the land, etc. Moreover, 
performance could also be hampered by pricing issues arising from the anticipated and perceived 
scope of work being different with the subcontractor which may lead to claims for extra work done or 
claiming for more work than what has been performed.  
 
On the one hand if the main contractor chooses a subcontractor with mediocre skills of performance, 
one could argue that the responsibility should lie fairly and squarely with the main contractor. For 
example, the main contractor could intentionally select a subcontractor, whose quality of work is not 
excellent, at a cheaper price, taking upon themselves to rectify any defects. On the other hand, ground 
realities may be such that contractors may not have a choice given that there is a shortage of skilled 
subcontractors. Even if this is not the case, what if the selected subcontractor does not provide its best 
team to the job? What if the subcontractor having completed the work seemingly well does not return 
back to fix a latent defect? What if the main contractor overpays a subcontractor for one reason or the 
other? There is no doubt of the risks that prevail. 
 
Main contractors may choose to accept such risks or transfer these to other parties depending on who 
is best suited to manage the risk. On the other hand, irrespective of who is best suited, the main 
contractor may choose to accept the risk for a reward (e.g. a cheaper price resulting in lower costs and 
greater profits) but in doing so minimise any risks by adopting other strategies, for example, by 
providing better supervision, seeking performance bonds, or even retaining a percentage from 
payments due to a subcontractor. However, what seems to occur in practice is that all subcontractors 
are treated alike when back-to-back contract terms are applied irrespective of their performance 
history, the type of work undertaken, or their risk profile (Abeysekera, 2012).  
 
Does risk really play a role in retention rates imposed on subcontractors…? Do some trades carry 
more risk than other trades? Are some subcontractors riskier than others? Does a high retention rate of 
10% provide a safety net against adverse consequences? Is it a blanket response? These are some 
questions that need to be answered to understand the risk-retention mechanism in order to develop a 
lasting solution to ‘retention’ concerns of subcontractors. 
 
 
4.0 A METHODOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE RISK-RETENTION 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
Given the above background, the main purpose of this study is to develop a methodology for 
understanding the risk-retention relationship for which purpose, it is necessary to: 
 
 understand current practice 
 assess level of risk of the selected building trades 
 assess level of risk in relation and retention regime 
 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the study focussed on building work in the formal sector of 
the construction industry.  
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Selection of trades: 
 
Given that there is extensive subcontracting as noted before, it would be necessary to consider all 
building trades, and the trades listed in the Standard Method of Measurement of Building Works 
(NZS4202:1995) was used for this purpose. As there were over 35 trades, it was decided to narrow 
down the number to a manageable proportion focussing on typically subcontracted trades which are 
shown in Table 1. In all 22 trades were selected.  
 
Sample selection: 
 
One of the characteristics of the New Zealand construction industry is that there are only a handful of 
contractors who handle large scale construction work. They are well known and occupy an envious 
position in construction industry with each of these companies employing a large volume of 
subcontractors often influencing how the rest of the construction industry engages with 
subcontractors. All such companies operate in all the main cities with Auckland being the most 
populous city in New Zealand and perhaps the city with the highest volume of commercial 
construction work. Thus, the companies were selected from Auckland. The study focussed on these 
large and medium-scale construction companies and a number of construction companies were 
approached with 10 companies agreeing to participate in this study. 
 
Data was collected through face to face interviews mainly as a strategy to ensure that all these 
companies participated. It was seen necessary to select interviewees who had the authority to fix 
retention regimes and who had a good understanding of the implementation of such regimes. Pursuant 
to a desk-top survey, it was established that the chief quantity surveyor was the best person to be 
interviewed. 
  
Data collection 
 
In order to achieve sub-objectives (noted at the beginning of this section), data were collected using 
two score cards, one for current practice, and the other for level of risk indicating whether the 
likelihood and consequence was high, medium, or low whilst keeping in mind the do’s and don’ts 
when conducting such interviews. 
 
To assess the level of risk for the selected trades, interviewees were questioned on the likelihood and 
consequences of a performance default when working with an ‘average’ subcontractor.  A qualitative 
scale of ‘high-medium-low’ with three responses was used for assessing likelihood and consequence 
(AS4360:1999). When assessing overall risk in relation to a retention regime, the same qualitative 
scale was used.  
 
 
Data analysis 
 
Qualitative data related to current practice was tabulated as shown in Fig. 1 and a composite retention 
rate was calculated as follow (see Fig 1 for data). This was repeated for the selected trades (22 in all):  
 
Current Composite Retention Rate = (4 x 0% + 1 x 5% + 5 x 10% x 0 x 15% + 0 x 20%)/10 = 5.5% 
 
An average defects liability period (DLP) was also calculated depending on whether the DLP was 
from subcontractor(SC)’s or main contractor(MC)’s practical completion (PC), making a note on 
whether these practices were adopted mainly by large contractors or medium scale contractors (see 
bottom right corner of Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1: Current practice for Demolition Trade 
 
As mentioned before, levels of risks for different trades were assessed through a qualitative approach 
using high, medium, and low to assess performance default risk. Data so obtained was transferred to a 
matrix form with livelihood and consequence as axes (Fig. 2). Notations ‘1’ and ‘2’ were used for 
depicting the responses of medium-scale and large-scale contractors respectively. These responses 
were converted to numeric data by assigning values for high, medium, low risk as 2.5, 1.5 and 0.5 
mainly as a means of comparing risks across trades than as an absolute measure of risk. The relative 
proportions could have been taken as 3, 2 and 1 as well or any other but in this case, distance (along 
the axes) to the centre of box (square) depicting a level of risk was taken as the relative weights. Data 
in Fig. 1 shows responses from 10 contractors consisting of 3 large scale contractors (note as ‘2’) and 
7 medium scale contractors (noted as ‘1’). Accordingly, the average overall likelihood score and 
consequence would be as follows noting that the maximum score possible is 2.5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Tabulated data for Demolition Trade 
 
Average Overall Likelihood (L) Score   = (0 x 2.5 + 1 x 1.5 + 9 x 0.5)/10 = 0.6 
Average Overall Consequence (C) Score  = (0 x 2.5 + 3 x 1.5 + 7 x 0.5)/10 = 0.8 
 
Data so converted for likelihood and consequence was multiplied to arrive at an overall risk for a 
particular trade as noted below:  
  
Risk= k x L
a
 x C
b
 (HB436, 2004) with 
‘k’ (a constant), ‘a’ and ‘b’ as powers of L and C being taken as 1. 
Accordingly, 
 
Average Overall Risk Score for Trade = 0.6 x 0.8 = 0.48 ≈ 0.5 … (1) 
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These scores relate to the second objective. It is useful at this stage to review what these mean noting 
that these are not absolute scores of risk. However, in comparison with the maximum score of 2.5 for 
L and C, the scores of 0.6 and 0.8 indicate a low performance default. Similarly, as the overall score is 
only 0.5 when compared with a maxim of 6.5 (2.5 x 2.5), the potential for a performance default of 
this trade can be concluded to be low.  
 
Ideally, a third measure is required, i.e. an overall measure of risk as perceived by the contractors in 
relation to the rate and the release mechanisms they wish to apply taking risk as the main criterion 
(quite apart from market and other considerations). This would have been useful for validating the 
product measure of risk (i.e. L x C) which is not discussed in this study.   
 
Results so computed were analysed to ascertain whether practices of large and medium scale 
contractors were different with respect to building trades. Additionally, trades were classified into 
three categories, viz. front-end trades, mid-trades, and end-trades (see Table 1) to examine whether 
these broad categories of trades were treated differently by main contractors. 
 
 
 
5.0 CURRENT RETENTION PRACTICES IN SUBCONTRACTING 
 
In order to describe current practice, there is a need for a number of indicators as a cursory 
examination of theories on retentions would provide (Abeysekera, 2008). However, in this study, this 
has been limited to indicators for retention regimes only. These indicators shown in Table 1 present a 
rich picture giving a first time understanding on existing practices in the New Zealand building 
industry.    
 
Results show that two trades, namely, Metal Windows and Doors, and Solid Plaster/Cladding are 
significant in that all respondents stated that they hold 10% as retentions. Interestingly, there were 
another 12 trades with this high retention rate (see shaded values in Table 1) where over 80% of the 
respondents claimed usage. Excavation was another trade that had a high retention rate with a 
composite retention rate higher than 8%. Approximately 2/3rds of the trades fell within the above 
mentioned characteristics. Furthermore, defects liability period for these trades were computed mainly 
from contractor’s practical completion (PC) and not from SC’ PC with the exception of four trades, 
namely, Excavation, Piling, Drainage, and Brick/Blockwork where some contractors opted for setting 
DLPs from subcontractor’s PC. Interestingly, these exceptions were all frontend trades (see comment 
about backend trades and DLPs later). In essence, this amounts to the use of back-to-back contract 
terms with the exception of DLPs which is seen to be the most unfavourable/harshest retention regime 
for subcontractors. However, not all trades attract retentions: One such trade is Reinforcement Steel 
where 80% of the contractors did not claim to hold retentions. The others that followed closely are 
Precast Concrete (50%), Demolition (40%), Concrete Work (40%) and Excavations (30%) with such 
favourable retention regimes provided mainly by medium scale contractors and not by large scale 
contractors (Table 1). As to why this is so needs more investigation and has not been undertaken in 
this study.  
 
It is also useful to note that of the frontend trades one third had relatively low DLPs, namely, 
Excavation, Pre-cast Concrete, and Reinforcement (see ‘#’ on last column of Table 1) although this 
would not be the case where contractors set DLPs from MC’s PC. Of the mid-trades, none had low 
DLPs as the period was set mainly from MC’s PC. This is the case with back-end trades too. From a 
project management perspective, this seems to be a convenient approach for the MC (with one release 
date for most subcontractors) although this was not examined in this study. On further reflection of 
the results in Table1, it should be possible to classify retention regimes as shown in Table 2. As to 
whether these and other observations made above are linked with performance default risk is 
discussed in Section 6. 
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Table 1: Current Practice in relation to elements defining a retention regime 
 
TRADES 
Retention rate Com-
posite 
Retenti
on 
Rate: 
CRR 
DLP (months) 
Trades 
with-
out 
DLPs 
by 
Trades 
without
DLPs 
offered 
by 
DLP 
commen-
ces from 
(S: sub-
contractor; 
M- main 
contractor) 
Avg. 
DLP 
from 
MCs 
PC 
(m) 
Avg. 
DLP 
from 
Sub’s 
PC (m) 
0
% 
5
% 
10
% 
0 1 3 6 12 
% of 
respondents 
% of respondents 
Frontend Trades 
Demolition 40 10 50 5.5 40 20 30 10 
 
40% MC only S+M’s PC 4.0 1.7 
Excavation 10 20 70 8.0 30 20 40 10 
 
30% MC only S+M’s PC 3.6 1.0# 
Piling 
 
10 90 9.5 20 20 50 10 
 
20% MC only S+M’s PC 3.6 1.7# 
Concrete work 40 30 30 4.5 40 20 30 10 
 
40% MC only S+M’s PC 4.0 1.7 
Pre-cast Conc. 50 20 30 4.0 50 10 30 10 
 
50% LC+MC S+M’s PC 3.0 3.3# 
Reinforcement 
Steel 
80 - 20 2.0 80 
 
20 
  
80% LC+MC S+M’s PC 3.0 - 
Structural 
Steel 
- 20 80 9.0 - 
 
70 20 10 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
4.7 5.0 
Brick & Block 
Work 
10 10 80 8.5 10 
 
60 20 10 10% MC only S+M’s PC 4.9 3.0 
Drainage - 10 90 9.5 
 
10 50 
 
40 - - S+M’s PC 7.5 2.0 
Mid Trades 
Metal 
Window & 
Doors 
- - 100 10.0 - 
 
70 20 10 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
4.5 - 
Carpentry 40 30 30 4.5 40 10 40 10 
 
40% MC only 
Mainly 
MC’s PC 
3.6 1.0# 
Joinery 10 10 80 8.5 10 10 70 10 
 
10% MC only 
Mainly 
MC’s PC 
3.4 1.0# 
Roofing - 10 90 9.5 - - 70 20 10 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
4.5 - 
Plumbing & 
Gas 
- 10 90 9.5 - - 50 10 40 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
7.1 - 
Mech. 
Services 
- 10 90 9.5 - - 40 10 50 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
7.8 - 
Fire 
Protection 
- 10 90 9.5 - - 40 10 50 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
7.8 - 
Electrical 
Services 
- 10 90 9.5 - - 40 10 50 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
7.8 - 
Backend Trades 
Solid Plaster / 
Cladding 
- 
 
100 10.0 - - 80 10 10 - - 
MC’s PC 
always 
4.2 - 
GIB Fix & 
Stop 
20 20 60 7.0 20 10 60 10 - 20% MC only 
Mainly 
MC’s PC 
3.4 1.0# 
Suspended 
Grid Ceilings 
- 20 80 9.0 - 10 80 10 - - - 
Mainly 
MC’s PC 
3.3 1.0# 
Floor 
Coverings 
- 10 90 9.5 - 10 80 10 - - - 
Mainly 
MC’s PC 
3.3 1.0# 
Painting & Sp. 
Finishes 
- 10 90 9.5 - 
 
80 10 10 - - 
MC's PC 
always 
4.2 - 
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Table 2: Classifying retention regimes in practice in increasing order of favourability to 
subcontractors 
 Retention Characteristic  
 
 
 
 
No. of  
Trades                      Trade descriptions 
 Retention 
Rate 
DLP 
mainly 
from 
MC’s 
PC 
DLP Some 
DLP from 
MCs 
and/or 
some 
from SC’s 
PC 
1 HIGH √ High - 4 Plumbing & Gas,  Mechanical Services, Fire 
Protection, Electrical 
2 HIGH √ Med - 5 Structural Steel Work, Metal Windows & Doors, 
Solid Plaster/Cladding, Roofing, Painting 
       
3 HIGH - Low √ 3 Excavation, Piling, Brick/Block Work, Joinery, 
GIB Fix and Stop, Ceilings, Floor Covering 
4 MEDIUM - High √ 1 Drainage 
5 MEDIUM - Med √ 1 Demolition 
6 LOW √ Low  1 Carpentry 
       
7 LOW  Med √ 1 Concrete Work 
8 LOW  Low √ 2 Pre-cast Concrete, Reinforcement 
Notes:  1. Retention rates: High – CRR >8; Med - CPR 5 to 8; Low – CPR <5  
2. DLP: High - > 7.5 months; Med - 4 to 7.5 from MC’s PC, or 2 to 7.5 from SC’s 
PC; Low - <4 from MC’s PC, or < 2 from SC’s PC.  
 
 
6.0 RISK-RETENTION RELATIONSHIP 
 
In order to understand whether current retention rates correlated with performance default risk, a plot 
between these two variables was examined as illustrated in Fig. 3. It became clear that retention rates 
(note: not regimes) in practice did not appear to show an association with risk, given the scatter of the 
distribution with no apparent relationship.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Variation of current retention rates with perceived risk 
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This raises the question whether current practice when viewed holistically, i.e. from a retention 
regime perspective, has an association with risk. For instance, it was mentioned in Section 5 that two 
thirds of the trades (14 in all out of the 22 studied) had high retention rates. Of these 14 trades, 
according to information given in Table 2, had longer DLPs with releases tied to MCs’ PC (categories 
1 and) with the most unfavourable retention regimes from a subcontractor point of view.  Thus one of 
the questions that arise is whether the risk levels of these trades are high enough to warrant an 
extreme retention regime. Information in Table 4 with regards to risk levels marked within 
parenthesis, and Table 5 information on ‘likelihood’ (L) and ‘consequence’ (C) levels of different 
trades provides greater insights as discussed below.  
 
Firstly, consider issues related to L and C based on results in Table 5. Consider a composite retention 
rates (CRR) 9% and over as high. This is a reasonable choice. Focussing on the front-end trades, it is 
seen that all trades with a high consequence (i.e. above median), has a high CRR (see shaded cells). 
Similarly, with respect to mid-trades, all trades but one (Carpentry) that have high (above median) 
values for L or C, has high CRRs. Finally, focussing on the backend trades, unlike the frontend and 
mid trades, of the five trades therein, only one trade showed such an association (Solid 
Plaster/Cladding). As for other trades, one with a high L (GIB Fix and Stop), and three others (i.e. 
Suspended Grid Ceiling, Floor Coverings, Painting and Special Finishes) with high CRRs (>9%) did 
not show the association that a high L or C results in a high CRR. Whilst these trades need further 
investigation, 17 out of the 22 trades displayed this association. This is an interesting discovery about 
the link between risk and retention of current practice despite the lack of association with respect to 
retention rate and overall risk described earlier (see Fig 3). 
 
Table 4: Superimposing current Practice with risk levels 
 
  Current 
practice 
categories as 
in Table 1 
 
 
Type 
1 
1a 1 Plumbing & Gas (1.2),  Mechanical Services (1.6), Fire Protection (0.8), 
Electrical Services (1.0)  
1b 2 Structural Steel Work (1.7), Metal Windows & Doors (2.6), Solid 
Plaster/Cladding (2.1), Roofing (1.8), Painting (1.1) 
    
Type 
2 
 3 Excavation (0.8), Piling (1.7), Brick/Block Work (0.5), Joinery (0.5), GIB 
Fix and Stop (1.6), Ceilings (0.6), Floor Covering (0.9) 
 4 Drainage (0.7) 
 5 Demolition (0.5) 
 6 Carpentry (1.6) 
    
Type 
3 
 7 Concrete Work (1.5) 
 8 Pre-cast Concrete (1.4), Reinforcement (1.0) 
 
Secondly, consider issues related to defects liability period and risk focussing on Table 4 with Table 2 
re-cast with risk levels shown within parenthesis and retention regimes amalgamated into three types 
based on non-friendliness/harshness of the retention regime for subcontractors. What is interesting 
about Type 1 trades is that all have risk levels above the median except for Painting (which is a 
median trade). In fact, for all Type 1 trades, contractors set DLPs mainly from their PC. Thus, higher 
the risk, more harsh the regime applied. As for Types 2 and 3 trades, risks are below the median and 
holding/release mechanisms for retentions are seen to be less harsh thereby establishing an association 
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between risk and retention regime with the exception of Piling, Carpentry, Concrete Work and Pre-
cast Concrete all of which have a risk level above the median. These exceptions need to be 
investigated further to understand whether there are more overwhelming reasons for less than harsh 
and comparatively favourable retention regimes (which may be the result of market forces). Others 
that need further investigation are Demolition, Brick/Block work, Joinery with the lowest level of risk 
yet with a Type 2 regime than a Type 3 regime if risks associate with retention regimes. Could the 
reasons for the latter be explained through Abeysekera’s Cash Cow Theory (2008)? Only further 
investigations would reveal this. 
 
Table 5: Performance default risk levels 
 
 
 
TRADES  
Perceived Risk Profile Av. (Max score 2.5 for L & C;  
Max score for L x C is 6.25) 
Current 
Composite 
Retention Rate 
Overall        Likelihood 
(L)  Av. 
Overall               
Consequence (C)  
Av. 
L x C 
Risk 1 
Frontend     L x C  
Demolition 0.6 0.8 0.5 5.5 
Excavation 0.8 1 0.8 8 
Piling 0.9 1.9 1.7 9.5 
Concrete Work 1.1 1.4 1.5 4.5 
Pre-cast Conc. 0.9 1.5 1.4 4 
Reinforcement Steel 0.9 1.1 1.0 2 
Structural Steel 0.9 1.9 1.7 9 
Brick & Block Work 0.6 0.8 0.5 8.5 
Drainage 0.7 1 0.7 9.5 
Mid        
Metal Windows & Doors 1.3 2 2.6 10 
Carpentry 1.2 1.3 1.6 4.5 
Joinery 0.6 0.8 0.5 8.5 
Roofing 1.2 1.5 1.8 9.5 
Plumbing & Gas 0.9 1.3 1.2 9.5 
Mech. Services 0.8 2 1.6 9.5 
Fire Protection 0.6 1.4 0.8 9.5 
Electrical Services 0.7 1.4 1.0 9.5 
Backend        
Solid Plaster/ Cladding 1.5 1.4 2.1 10 
GIB Fix & Stop 1.3 1.2 1.6 7 
Suspended Grid Ceilings 0.7 0.9 0.6 9 
Floor Coverings 0.8 1.1 0.9 9.5 
Painting & Special 
Finishes 
0.9 1.2 1.1 9.5 
 
 
Range 
Max. 
1.5 
Plaster 
2 
Windows/Mech-
anical Services* 
2.6 
Windows 
10 
Windows/ 
Plaster 
Min. 
0.6 
Demolition, Brick & 
Block Work, Joinery, 
Fire Protection 
0.8 
Demolition, 
Brick/Block 
work 
0.5 
Demolition
/Brick/ 
Joinery 
2 
Reinforcement 
 Median 0.9 1.3 1.1  
* Piling/Structural Steel 1.9 
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Thirdly, consider the situation of Category 2 trades (Type 1b) all of which have a high risk level than 
Category 1 trades although with a somewhat lower DLP suggesting that contractors seem to prefer 
higher retention rates than longer DLPs despite higher risks without taking into consideration the 
nature of the trade (for instance, where a longer DLP would have been more suitable to judge 
performance over changing seasons). Whilst this seems to provide further evidence that retention 
regime has a better association with risk than retention rate, it seems that contractors appear to prefer 
higher retention rates than longer durations. Whilst the reasons have not been investigated, once 
again, Abeysekera’s Cash Cow Theory (2008) may provide an explanation.  
 
These observations raise the question as to whether given an opportunity of setting a retention regime 
entirely on consideration of risk levels, would retention regimes for Concrete Work and Pre-cast 
Concrete etc. be different. This is a matter that needs to be investigated by seeking information from 
these respondents regarding their perceived levels of risk and associated retention regimes. Moreover, 
it would also be useful to investigate whether for a given level of risk, the trade-off between retention 
rate and holding/release mechanism of retentions. For instance, as to whether contractors would prefer 
a higher retention rate for a less than adequate defects liability period, is a connected issue. This is an 
important and useful exploration of this study that seeks to understand the risk-retention relationship.  
 
The study mentioned in the previous paragraph provides another measure for risk (i.e. overall risk 
without the product measure of ‘likelihood’ and ‘consequence’) which can then be used for validating 
the product measure of risk (i.e. L x C) with this overall measure based on high, medium, or low type 
responses for ‘overall risk’ of a trade. Collecting data for other trades (not covered in this study) could 
be used for checking external validity. The weights used for converting qualitative scores to numerical 
scores (i.e. 2.5, 1.5, and 0.5) need further investigation including whether ‘x’ and ‘y’ of the product 
measure of L
x
 x C
y
 should be taken as 1 (see Section 3, data analysis).  
 
 
7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of this study was to investigate the risk-retention relationship 
by developing a methodology to understand this relationship. 
 
In general, it was found that retention rates used in practice did not show an association with the 
overall (performance default) risk as current rates were primarily based on a paradoxically fair 
contractual practice of using back-to-back terms except with regard to holding/release mechanisms.  
 
In contrast, when the risk-retention relationship was examined by the two components of risk, it is 
seen that for trades with high (above median) values of either consequence or likelihood (or both), 
composite retention rates used are high (over 9%), and for less than high values, the retention rates are 
lower thereby establishing a relationship between risk and retention to this extent with 17 out of the 
22 trades studied displaying this association. The trades that did not, need further investigation to 
check whether there were other overwhelming reasons for these exceptions. 
 
When examining the risk-retention relationship from a holistic approach taking retention regime as 
consisting of rate and release mechanisms, it may be concluded that higher the risk, harsher the 
retention regime. The converse is also true too but a lower level of risk or a medium level or risk, did 
not necessarily result in a commensurate response, i.e. low risks with favourable regimes, and 
medium risks with less than harsh regimes. This may be due to other overwhelming factors related to 
market conditions, project management convenience, or due to other considerations. 
 
For a given level of risk, theoretically there could be many different types of retention regimes. 
However, for trades with high levels of risks, contractors seem to prefer higher retention rates than 
longer defects liability periods.  
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If the risk-retention relationship was examined purely from a risk perspective using perceived risks 
and perceived retention regimes, it should be possible to obtain a greater understanding about this 
relationship. 
 
In relation to the theory of Retention Reciprocity, it appears that if contractors are to provide 
favourable regimes, subcontractors may need to address ways and means of reducing risk for the main 
contractor. However, one of the contentious issues is whether in fact, despite a high level of risk, the 
retention regimes imposed are fair (see Abeysekera, 2012). Finally, it needs to be mentioned that 
‘risk’ as discussed herein is no doubt a beastly characteristic for the client – a characteristic the 
principal author had not addressed in his Beast Theory on Retentions. Understanding gained from this 
study would assist in developing this further vis-a-vis how best to cope with this beastly 
characteristic. 
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